Notes while reading Gilson's Medieval Book

Long ago, I heard that Gilson noted that the word "is" is used in the same sense in the works of Plato and in the tetragrammaton, despite there having been no connection yet between the Greeks and the Israelites of 1350 B.C. I resolved then- 45 years ago, to get this book, and finally have acquired it.

His comment on Romans 1, basing Christian philosophy on what is implied there, is very helpful.

Gilson seems to assume that philosophy is the universal of "a philosophy," a comprehensive view. That this is always partial whether Christian or pre-christian would seem to mean that both faith and reason are simply different kinds of opinion.

The supposed polytheism of Plato and Aristotle might be a rhetorical concession- look closely. Neither could imagine what occurred with Christianity, which means they expected tradition and piety to always be "polytheistic." And do you want our pre-Christians to be traditional and pious? Or not?

And we have the angels and saints- as they do gods and heroes. What if angels appeared to Greeks? But there are obviously universal higher than human things like justice, eros, etc- that effect humans. What do we call these?

Is it not written "I said YOU ARE gods, sons of the Most High."

Thinking of God as being is helpful. p 55, G. says that the I Am has being as primary, while the account in Republic has good as primary and not including existence, as the best of anything is rarely exampled.

When things get better, where does that additional good come from?

Good is of course not created in Genesis, but is seen by God, that it is good. Jesus says, "no one is good but God alone," (Luke 18:18) No one is good except God."

I recall the statement of Strauss that it is not possible to speak of God without contradiction. I'll look up the exact words...

That good is an aspect of being may cohere with good in Genesis 1.

Gilson has yet to say, "beyond being." That the cause of the whats is beyond what. It is a what, the one beyond whats!

"we do not say that he is because he is perfect, but that he is perfect because he is." A sense of is that includes the perfect and the telos. This is similar to the way that what we call conscience may be included in the words reason and nous.